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1 Introduction  
 
It is a well-established result, both theoretically and empirically, that taxes play an impor-
tant role in determining the capital structure of companies (e.g. Modigliani and Miller, 
1958, 1963; Desai, Foley and Hines, 2004). A multinational company in particular can 
choose its capital structure according to differences in international taxation, in order to 
minimize the tax burden of the whole company group. Borrowing from affiliates located in 
low-tax countries and lending to affiliates in high-tax locations will allow a deduction of 
interest payments from profits at high-tax locations and a reduction of the overall tax pay-
ments. Typically, high-tax countries attempt to restrict the use of inter-company loans by 
imposing so-called thin-capitalization or earning stripping rules to limit adverse revenue 
consequences. In recent years, increased attention has been given to the role of multina-
tionals’ profit shifting via inter-company loans. For example, the number of EU member 
countries that rely on some form of debt-to-equity restriction has increased from 8 in 1996 
to 16 in 2005. From a theoretical perspective, these rules are suitable for limiting profit 
shifting (e.g. Fuest and Hemmelgarn, 2005; Panteghini, 2006). Nevertheless, empirical 
evidence as to whether governments have been successful is still rare. Indeed, this is cru-
cial for policy makers who want to defend tax revenues against multinationals’ cross-
country tax planning. However, effective thin-capitalization rules possibly imply less fi-
nancial flexibility for some firms and adversely affect investment. In order to evaluate this 
trade-off, it is important to find out more about the impact of thin-capitalization rules on 
financial decisions and the associated tax-revenue effects.  
 
In providing evidence on the tax sensitivity of companies’ capital structure choices, previ-
ous empirical studies have usually not taken into account thin-capitalization rules. How-
ever, for a sample of US controlled affiliates, Desai et al. (2004) show that higher local tax 
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2
rates are associated with higher debt-to-asset ratios. Their analysis points out that particu-
larly internal borrowing of US companies reacts  sensitively to taxation. This result is con-
firmed by Buettner et al. (2006a), and by Mintz and Weichenrieder (2005) for German 
multinationals. So far, evidence for the effects of thin-capitalization rules on companies’ 
decisions has only been provided by Buettner et al. (2006b). They find that thin-
capitalization rules effectively restrict debt finance but also affect investment levels of 
German outbound investments. 
 
The question we address in this paper is whether thin-capitalization rules effectively re-
strict multinationals tax-planning behaviour. For our empirical research we take German 
inbound investment data. We expect German multinationals to engage in tax-planning ac-
tivities, because hardly any other country has higher statutory corporate tax rates than 
Germany. We exploit legal amendments of the German thin-capitalization rule in 2001 and 
2004, where only some legal forms were treated. This quasi-experimental setting enables 
us to use a difference-in-differences approach to identify whether thin-capitalization rules 
are successfully imposed. Our empirical analysis shows that both tax-rate differentials and 
thin-capitalization rules are crucial for multinationals’ capital structures. In particular, our 
findings indicate that some companies, which were affected by a stricter thin-capitalization 
rule, subsequently adjusted their capital structure. Hence, governments in high-tax coun-
tries are, to some extent, able to restrict multinationals’ profit shifting. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. We begin with some institutional details about the Ger-
man thin-capitalization rule. Thereafter, we set up a theoretical model, which considers the 
financing decision of a multinational and takes into account a thin-capitalization rule. In 
sections 4 and 5 we present the empirical investigation approach and the data. The empiri-
cal results are presented in section 6. Section 7 briefly concludes. 
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2 Some Institutional Details 
The high level of German company taxation but also the comparatively low corporate tax 
revenues are well documented (see European Communities, 2005). Firms are burdened 
with a very high statutory tax rate comprising a corporate income tax and, additionally, a 
local trade income tax.  
 
It is reasonable to assume that a multinational company allocates inter-company loans op-
timally with respect to differences in international taxation. Hence, taxable profits are re-
duced by means of interest deduction. As a result, jurisdictions lose corporate tax revenue 
and consequently try to defend their tax base by imposing some form of restriction, for 
example thin-capitalization rules. These rules, such as section 8(a) of the German corporate 
income tax law (KStG), typically limit interest deduction up to a fixed relation between 
equity and inter-company debt, i.e. the interest paid for an excess leverage cannot be de-
ducted from the tax base.  
 
Empirical identification of thin-capitalization rules, however, is difficult. In practice its 
application depends on several additional aspects besides the pure debt-to-equity ratio. 
Some inter-company loans are excluded, such as debt which fulfils the arm’s length princi-
ple requirements or trade accounts payable due to internal deliveries of input goods. Fur-
thermore, the debt-to-equity ratio is not only limited to internal leverage. For instance, a 
strategy called back-to-back finance, in which external debt is borrowed by an affiliate and 
simultaneously secured by a deposit of the parent company, is also prohibited by the Ger-
man thin-capitalization rule. Whether back-to-back finance is ultimately considered as par-
ent-company debt finance is often a matter of negotiation with tax authorities. Hence, we 
are not able to identify single companies in the data which are affected by thin-
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capitalization rules, although we know the exact German threshold levels. Therefore, we 
use changes in the rules for some company groups, depending on their legal form, to obtain 
exogenous variation in this crucial explanatory variable. 
 
The German thin-capitalization rule only applies to foreign affiliates that are incorporated.1
First-tier foreign partnerships are not affected by the restriction and constitute a suitable 
non-treatment group when looking at legal amendments of this rule as natural experiments. 
The rule classifies two different types of incorporated companies. The first group of com-
panies comprises ordinary corporations which are not classified as holdings. For purposes 
of this law, a holding is defined as a firm where more than 75% of total assets consist of 
shares in other corporations. For ordinary corporations, the allowed debt-to-equity ratio, 
called safe haven, was accepted at 3:1 before 2001. Yet, the safe haven debt-to-equity ratio 
was 9:1 in the case of a holding corporation, i.e. holdings could be used as loopholes. In 
2001 and 2004, two important amendments of the German thin-capitalization rule were 
introduced. In 2001 the allowed debt-to-equity ratios were significantly reduced to 1.5:1 in 
the case of an ordinary corporation and to 3:1 in the case of a holding corporation, respec-
tively. Nevertheless, a possible loophole in the shap  of holding corporations remained. In 
2004, this special rule for holding corporations was also abolished, i.e. the safe haven was 
generally constituted at 1.5:1 for every corporation. However, first-tier partnerships were 
not affected by these amendments. 
 
To illustrate the change in the thin-capitalization rule, let us consider the following exam-
ple. A German holding corporation has used internal debt as a source of finance, with an 
internal-debt-to-equity ratio of 4:1 in 2000. Hence, this corporation was allowed to deduct 
interest payments without restriction. Following the 2001 tax reform, however, the ac-
 
1 One exemption would be the German rule introduced in 2004 which applies to cases in which a second-tier 
partnership is held by incorporated foreign affiliates. However, these cases are not considered in our analysis. 
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5
cepted ratio was reduced to 3:1. Therefore, the corporation was no longer able to deduct 
interest payments for 5 percentage points of its debt-to-equity share. Nevertheless, the cor-
poration was not prohibited from maintaining its debt-to-equity ratio. It is important to bear 
in mind, however, that not every corporationIirrespective of its legal formIis affected by a 
stricter thin-capitalization rule. It is highly possible that many firms fall below the accepted 
debt-to-equity relation anyway. We will come back to this point in section 6, discussing 
which implications this has for the estimated coefficients. 
 
3 A Model 
 
We explain the impact of company taxation on the choice of debt or equity as a subsidi-
ary’s source of finance by the following simple model. We consider a firm with two sepa-
rate companies, of which the parent company is denoted by 1 and the subsidiary by 2. If 
the parent company and the subsidiary are completely financed with equity, profits are 
determined by 
)()1)(()1)(( 212211 kkrtkftkf ++= .
1k and 2k denote invested capital, )( jkf output at location j , 1t and 2t the statutory tax 
rates at the respective locations. The opportunity costs of own capital are )( 21 kkr + . Note 
that an exemption system of repatriated foreign profits is assumed.2
The parent company can decide on the type of capital that is used to finance the subsidiary. 
Instead of equity, the parent company can provide capital by means of an inter-company 
loan. We denote the share of capital that is financed by such an internal credit as 2µ , and 
the internal interest rate as 2i . Interest payments, 22µi , can be deducted for tax purposes by 
 
2 This is true for most European countries and Canada. Furthermore, the effect of a credit system equals an 
exemption system if t2 > t1.. Otherwise, the affiliate’s tax rate increases to t1, depending on the time of reten-
tion. However, the general incentives remain if foreign profits are not distributed immediately. 
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6
the borrowing subsidiary 2. Simultaneously, interest payments are taxed at the lending 
company. Hence, the tax consequences of an inter-company credit are 
)( 12222 ttki
i µ ,
where it2 is the tax rate avoided because of interest deduction. This tax rate can differ from 
the statutory company tax rate if interest payments are not fully deductible from corporate 
income. For example, in Germany only half of all interest payments can be deducted for 
local income tax purposes, i.e. 22 tt
i < .
Moreover, we assume that inter-company loans are associated with additional costs, for 
example agency costs, because of asymmetric information (see Jensen and Meckling, 
1976; Myers, 1977). Neverth less, there are also non-tax reasons to use inter-company 
debt, such as short-term cash management between parent and affiliate, or the opportunity 
to control the local management through fixed annual interest payments (see Jensen, 1986). 
Hence, we introduce a convex cost function, )( 22 µc ,
3 and a concave utility func-
tion, )( 22 µg .
4
Subsequently, the profit function of the firm can be described as 
.)]()()([
)()1)(()1)((
222221222
212211
kgctti
kkrtkftkf
i µµµ

++
++=
(1) 
Obviously, the transition of equity into inter-company debt implies a direct profit shift 
from the borrowing affiliate 2 to the lending parent company 1 if the tax rate of the bor-
rowing affiliate is higher than the tax rate of the lender. 
 
3 0
2
2 >
µd
dc
, 0
2
2
2
2
>
µd
cd
.
4 0
2
2 >
µd
dg
, 02
2
2
2
<
µd
gd .
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7
The tax-rate differential between both locations creates incentives to use equity refinanced 
internal debt as a source of finance. It implies that profits are shifted to the lending affili-
ate. However, jurisdictions attempt to counteract these activities by imposing thin-
capitalization rules, which typically limit interest deduction. Hence, interest paid for an 
excess leverage cannot be deducted from the tax base if jµ is above a certain fixed jµ .
We now assume that country 2 introduces such a rule, denoted by 2 , where 12 = if the 
rule is effectively binding, and 0 otherwise. Whether the rule is binding for an affiliate de-
pends on the difference between the actual inter-company debt share and the maximum 
accepted, i.e. whether a company is above the threshold level or not, and how the type of 
internal debt is classified for tax purposes. Note that 2 is always 0 if 22 µµ < . We extend 
the profit function by the additional tax payments arising from excess leverage above the 
thin-capitalization rule limit: 
222222 )( kti
iµµ  .
The profit function (1) becomes 
 
.)]()()()([
)()1)(()1)((
22222222221222
212211
kgctitti
kkrtkftkf
ii µµµµµ

++
++=
(2)                
 
The optimal share of inter-company debt of subsidiary 2 financed by parent equity is ob-
tained by the following first-order condition 
0)()()(
!
2,22,222122 =+ µµ µµ cgttti
ii . (3) 
 
First, we consider the case without application of a thin-capitalization rule. Accordingly, 
the share of inter-company debt is determined by the tax-rate difference between the bor-
rowing affiliate and the parent company, )( 12 tt
i  . The internal lending rate can be used to 
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8
leverage the tax effect. However, the interest rate is not likely to be an important degree of 
freedom, as the arm’s length principle easily applies. 
 
Secondly, we consider cases where the thin-capitalization rule is applied. If 2 becomes 1, 
any tax incentive to use internal debt is effectively stopped. In this case, only the tax-rate 
level at the location of the lending parent has an impact. Additionally, inter-company debt 
used for non-tax reasons becomes more expensive, because inter-company interest pay-
ments are taxed twice. Assuming a binding case, this is an incentive to reduce 2µ in order 
to avoid enforcement of the thin-capitalization rule. 
 
We can derive comparative static properties by differentiating the first-order condition: 
22212222212 ][][ ditttdtiidti
iii  ++ = .)]()([ 22,22,2 µµµ µµµµ dgc 
First, let us consider the effect of an increasing tax rate at the lending company’s location 
on the share of inter-company debt used by its affiliate.5 The derivative equals 
 
0
)()( 2,22,2
2
1
2 <


=
µµ
µ
µµµµ gc
i
dt
d . (4) 
 
Expression (4) is always negative, i.e. the inter-company debt used by an affiliate de-
creases with an increasing tax rate at the parent’s location. With regard to the marginal 
effect of an increasing tax rate at the affiliate's location we obtain 
 
.0
)()( 2,22,2
222
2
2 	


=
µµ
µ
µµµµ gc
ii
dt
d
i (5) 
 
This expression is positive when the thin-capitalization rule is not enforced, i.e. 
.02 = Otherwise, if the share of inter-company debt is above the limits, i.e. 12 = , a tax 
 
5 We assume a zero marginal tax-rate effect on the internal interest rate 
2i
. This is a reasonable assumption, 
because the arm’s length principle is easily applied to interest rates. 
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9
rate increase has no effect on the optimal share of inter-company debt. This can be ex-
plained by the fact that interest payments for the excessive debt cannot be deducted for tax 
purposes. Higher internal borrowing must be due to non-tax reasons, e.g. short-term cash 
management. Accordingly, a tax-rate variation does not matter for the optimal inter-
company debt in this case. To sum up, the following proposition can be set up: 
 
Proposition 1: The optimal share of inter-company debt should increase with an increas-
ing tax rate at the subsidiary’s location and decrease with an increasing tax rate at the 
parent’s location. Hence, if the share of internal debt is tax driven, the share of inter-
company debt should increase with an increasing tax-rate difference, ( 12 tt
i  ). 
 
Finally, let us consider a reform of the thin-capitalization rule. Germany significantly re-
duced the safe haven in 2001 and 2004, respectively. Given any distribution of µ , a
stricter thin-capitalization rule is associated with more companies above the lower thresh-
old level. Reductions of 2µ increase the number of cases for which 2 becomes one, i.e. 
where the rule is binding and enforced.  However, it should be emphasized that identifica-
tion of each affected company is difficult due to various reasons we already discussed in 
section 2. Equation (3) implies that tax incentives to use inter-company debt decrease. In 
this case, the firm reduces its debt share below the new threshold level and prefers equity 
as the marginal source of finance. Therefore, we would expect that the level of inter-
company loans has, on average, decreased since 2001 and 2004, respectively. 
 
Proposition 2: If inter-company debt is a channel for shifting taxable profits, and thin-
capitalization rules can limit tax-planning behaviour, a reduction of the allowed debt-to-
equity ratio should lead to smaller shares of inter-company debt. Non-incorporated com-
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panies, which are not treated by the German thin-capitalization rule and its amendments, 
do not reduce their inter-company debt levels. 
4 Empirical Implications 
 
We test the above propositions empirically by using data for German inbound FDI. A sim-
ple estimation approach to test proposition 1 could be a regression of the inter-company 
leverage, denoted by ICL, of an investment in country G (Germany) taken by firm k lo-
cated in country j in period t on the tax-rate differential ( tjtG STRSTR ,,  ) and on some 
company-specific characteristics tjx , . Thus, a simple regression equation would be 
 
ICL
tjktktjktjtGtjk aaxaSTRSTRaaICL ,,,,2,,10,, )( 
+++++= , (6) 
 
where ka is a company-specific effect to control for heterogeneity between company 
groups. Furthermore, we control for German capital market constraints or aggregate shocks 
by a time-specific effect ta . Note that we are able to identify tax-rate effects because of 
cross-country and time variation in tjSTR , . Following proposition 1, we expect a positive 
sign of the tax differential coefficient 1a on ICL . For inter-company debt, which is refi-
nanced by equity, the local interest rate at the lending parent country should be irrelevant. 
Only the German lending rate could be of importance, as it is used as the arm’s length 
benchmark by the German tax authority. However, we implicitly control for the German 
lending rate by time effects ta , since every inbound investor faces the same lending rate. 
 
We cannot explicitly identify companies which are affected by stricter thin-capitalization 
rules. However, two reforms in 2001 and 2004 constitute exogenous sources of variation, 
unambiguously affecting the average value of our dependent variable for some groups. 
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11
Hence, we test proposition 2 using a difference-in-differences approach (see for example 
Meyer, 1995). 
 
Different amendments of the German thin-capitalization rule have constituted three groups 
with different degrees of treatment. We use a dummy variable, TGROUPD , to denote the re-
spective treatment group, i.e. the corporations which were treated by a specific amendment 
of the thin-capitalization rule in 2001 or 2004, respectively. Additionally, we use a dummy 
variable postD to indicate the post-amendment observations from 2001 to 2004. In this 
manner, an estimation equation for the 2001 reform effect can be described as 
 
ICL
tjktkpostTGROUPTGROUPtjktjtGtjk bbDDbDbxbSTRSTRbbICL ,,43,,2,,10,, )( 
+++++++= .(7) 
 
The treatment group consists of both ordinary corporations and holding corporations. It is 
important to bear in mind that partnerships were not treated by the German thin-
capitalization rule and constitute a suitable non-treatment group of the reform in 2001. 
Group-independent time trends are absorbed by tb . Therefore, we implicitly control for 
yearly variations in German tax rates. The treatment effect is measured by 4b , where we 
expect a negative sign.  
 
Furthermore, for the 2004 reform effect, we propose the following equation 
 
ICL
tjktkTGROUPTGROUPtjktjtGtjk ccDDcDcxcSTRSTRccICL ,,200443,,2,,10,, )( 
+++++++= , (8) 
 
where only holdings were treated by the reform of the German thin-capitalization rule in 
2004. Therefore, all other companies, incorporated and non-incorporated, constitute the 
non-treatment group. We would also expect a negative sign of the treatment effect 4c .
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To sum up, the legal reforms enable us to test whether a thin-capitalization rule is effec-
tively imposed. The tax reform of 2001 only hit ordinary incorporated as well as holding 
companies. Partnerships, however, were not affected. In 2004, only holding corporations 
were affected. We argue that groups are comparable, because we observe only affiliates of 
multinationals. Hence, we look at firms which have the same opportunities with respect to, 
for example, internal finance. Furthermore, we control for differences across single in-
vestments, for example by using the affiliate-specific turnover as a control variable. We 
additionally assume that there are no systematic changes in within- and between-group 
compositions. In fact, our group sizes are almost stable over time. To identify the effect on 
the treated companies, a further critical assumption is that both groups are equally affected 
by aggregate shocks. 
 
5 Data and Descriptive Statistics 
 
The empirical analysis uses the MiDi database for multinationals provided by the Deutsche 
Bundesbank. This is a comprehensive annual micro database of direct investment positions 
of German enterprises held abroad as well as of direct investment positions held in Ger-
many by foreign companies. However, we employ only German inbound FDI data. The 
data provides information about the investment object’s balance sheet, including further 
information on the type of investment and on the investor. A favourable characteristic of 
the data is the possibility to trace direct investment positions of individual firms over time. 
The current version provides firm-level panel data for the period 1996 to 2004. The collec-
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tion of the data is enforced by German law, which sets reporting obligations for certain 
international transactions and positions.6
-- Insert Table 1 about here – 
 
The database comprises direct FDI and indirect FDI positions, for holdings above a certain 
threshold level. Given that the model deals with a simple two-tier company structure, indi-
rectly held investments are excluded. Moreover, we only keep observations exhibiting a 
non-zero inter-company debt share. Table 1 displays the number of observations in our 
sample, the means of the share of non-German internal debt, the means of the country-
specific tax-rate differentials, and the yearly average number of investment objects. Inves-
tors are mainly from Germany’s neighbouring countries, e.g. Switzerland, Austria, France, 
or the Netherlands. Of course, investors from other big economies such as Japan or the 
USA are also strongly represented. 
 
According to equation (6), we calculate the inter-company loan, borrowed from the foreign 
parent company, to total capital ratios, ICL, using the Midi data. In order to control for 
company-specific variation in the accession to external debt, we employ the turnover as an 
indicator of the size and the affiliate’s cash-flow in our regression analysis (see e.g. Panno, 
2003). We expect a negative effect of a higher turnover when external and internal debt 
serve as substitutes (see Buettner et al., 2006a). As agency costs and the utility of inter-
company debt may also vary across industries, we control for further heterogeneity by in-
cluding dummies for 56 industries at the level of the affiliate. 
 
6 Sec. 26 Aussenwirtschaftsgesetz (Law on Foreign Trade and Payments) in connection with Aussen-
wirtschaftsverordnung (Foreign Trade and Payment Regulations). Since 2002, FDI has to be reported if the 
participation is 10% or more and the balance sheet total of the foreign investment in Germany is above 3 
million Euro. For details see Lipponer (2006). Despite that previous years showed lower threshold levels, we 
apply this threshold level uniformly for all years in the panel. 
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The statutory tax-rate differential constitutes the relevant measure to investigate the tax 
impact on the use of inter-company debt. The variable GSTR contains German statutory 
profit tax rates;7 foreign statutory tax rates are denoted by FSTR . While using these two tax 
measures, bilateral tax-rate differences are constructed. Since the effective tax reduction 
from using debt might be zero if a subsidiary carries forward any losses for tax purposes 
(see MacKie-Mason, 1990; Francois, 2006), we include a dummy variable indicating 
whether some loss carry-forward is reported. Of course, the existence of some losses in the 
previous periods may capture other characteristics of the current decision problem of the 
company such as the expected performance of an affiliate. Thus, the overall effect on in-
ternal leverage is ambiguous. Table 2 displays basic information about the regression vari-
ables. 
 
-- Insert Table 2 about here -- 
 
6 Empirical Results 
 
The empirical analysis involves panel-data regressions that include company fixed effects. 
Hence, by using a within transformation, we generally control for all time-constant hetero-
geneity between company groups. 
 
-- Insert Table 3 about here -- 
 
First of all, it is worth mentioning that all regressions show the expected tax rate effect. In 
Table 3, specification (2) indicates, for example, that a 10 percentage point increase in the 
 
7 Our measure takes into account that only half of all interest payments can be deducted from the tax base of 
the German trade income tax. Furthermore, we consider the country average of the local trade income tax. 
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tax-rate differential between Germany and any other country is associated with a 1.9 per-
centage point higher internal-debt ratio. The magnitude of the tax effect is in line with ear-
lier findings, see e.g. Desai et al. (2004), or Buettner et al. (2006a). This result indicates 
that tax-rate differentials play an important role in the choice of financial structures. With 
regard to the effect of the German thin-capitalization reform in 2001, we control for sys-
tematic differences in the control and treatment group by introducing a treatment-group 
dummy variable, TGROUPD . First, we do not distinguish between different treatment groups 
in specifications (3)-(5) of Table 3. While we interact the treatment group with a post-
reform dummy, POSTD , for the whole period of 2001 until 2004 in column (3), we control 
for each single year in columns (4) and (5). In column (4) we observe that the treated 
group, i.e. holdings and incorporated firms, responds to the tighter thin-capitalization rule, 
and internal lending is reduced in the post-reform period. Column (5) shows that the re-
form was by no means anticipated. Rather, it took the companies one year to reduce their 
internal debt shares. This is possibly the result of a restructuring process which started in 
2001. 
 
A company is only affected if the thin-capitalization rule is binding, i.e. if the firm’s debt-
to-equity share is above the maximally accepted share. In this case, the tax-planning firm 
should re-optimize its capital structure after the reform, if the construction so far has been 
optimal. Nevertheless, given the continuum of internal-debt-to-equity shares, not all corpo-
rations are affected. However, the mean share is reduced for the whole treatment group 
because of certain corporations. Consequently, the treatment effect would be much 
stronger if all treated corporations were noticeably affected. 
 
-- Insert Table 4 about here -- 
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In Table 4 we split the sample into different treatment groups. As already mentioned, we 
have two treatment groups for the 2001 reform, i.e. holdings and ordinary incorporated 
companies. The results are generally comparable, apart from the fact that the number of 
observations is reduced.8 The specifications (1)-(3) consider ordinary corporations as the 
treatment group and partnerships as the control group. Specifications (4)-(6) investigate the 
tax effects on inter-company debt of holding corporations; partnerships constitute the con-
trol group again. One major insight from Table 4 is that holdings adapt their capital struc-
ture much faster than ordinary incorporated companies. The restructuring process is possi-
bly easier, and therefore faster for some reason. Moreover, the threshold level was reduced 
more severely for holding corporations. Another reason might be the potential role of hold-
ing corporations as special tax-planning entities. 
 
The magnitude of the treatment effects can be interpreted as follows. For holding corpora-
tions, the 2001 thin-capitalization reform induced a decline in the share of internal debt 
borrowed from the foreign parent company of about 10 percentage points. This equals a 
reduction of approximately one-third, considering a pre-reform mean of 31.7 per cent inter-
company debt to total capital. 
 
Finally, we focus on the effect of the German thin-capitalization reform in 2004. This re-
form treated holding corporations only. The control group consists of all other legal forms. 
The results in Table 5 show once more that some companies restructure, basically those 
which were affected by the stricter rule, and reduce their internal debt share, i.e. the mean 
debt share decreases for the treated group. Specifications (1) and (2) are based on observa-
tions from 1996-2004. However, regressions in columns (3) and (4) are only based on ob-
servations from 2001 to 2004, in order to avoid the effect of the first thin-capitalization 
 
8 Note, however, that the group sizes are relatively constant for the 9 years in the sample. 
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reform in 2001. The magnitude of the 2004 reform effect is much lower compared to the 
2001 reform. Here, the share of inter-company debt is reduced by approximately 4.2 per-
centage points. This equals a reduction of about one sixth, given the pre-reform level of 26 
per cent inter-company debt to total capital. 
 
-- Insert Table 5 about here -- 
 
7 Conclusion 
 
We find that international tax-rate differentials play an important role in determining the 
share of internal lending to German affiliates. This confirms earlier results provided by 
other studies. The important insight of our empirical analysis is that German thin-
capitalization rules are effectively imposed. A reduction of the allowed debt-to-equity ra-
tios, enforced by reforms in 2001 and 2004, respectively, induced significantly smaller 
shares of inter-company loans of incorporated companies. 
 
Finally, we focus on revenue effects. Although we cannot estimate how much revenue 
Germany would lose in the absence of a thin-capitalization rule, rough estimations of the 
reform effects can be provided. First of all, we consider specifications (3) and (6) from 
Table 4. In 2002, the 2001 reform is associated with lower internal-debt-to-capital ratios of 
approximately 0.053 for ordinary corporations and 0.151 for holding corporations, respec-
tively. Given the respective mean values, Germany was able to retain, on average, 71,700 
Euros per ordinary corporation and  1,807,000 Euros per holding corporation in additional 
tax revenue through the tightening of the thin-capitalization rule.9 Considering the number 
of treated corporations, we estimate an amount of approximately 260 million Euros in ad-
 
9 We assume as price for the internal credit a German lending rate for credits to the private sector of 9.7% in 
2002 (IMF, 2005), and the 2002 statutory tax rate, 32.88%. 
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ditional tax revenue. Secondly, using specification (4) of Table 5, we estimate the addi-
tional tax revenue to be up to approximately 30 million Euros for the reform in 2004. Total 
amounts might be higher due to the treatment of indirectly held foreign affiliates or of 
other debt types. Moreover, the internal lending rate is not necessarily equivalent to the 
local lending rate. All estimated magnitudes can only be rough estimates, because we can-
not take into account that multinationalsIin case of restrictions on their capital structure 
choiceIare able to shift profits through other channels, e.g. by transfer-price setting. 
 
The German government is obviously aware that multinationals exploit tax-planning op-
portunities. Generally, our results suggest that governments are able to restrict these tax-
planning activities. However, restricting corporations in shifting profits can cause adverse 
investment effects of profit-shifting restrictions. This trade-off presents new challenges and 
opportunities for future research. 
 
Data Sources and Definitions 
 
Firm-level data are taken from the micro-level dataset of the Bundesbank, see Lipponer 
(2006) for an overview. The inter-company debt share from the foreign parent company 
is determined by the level of balance-sheet liabilities in the respective category divided 
by total capital consisting of registered capital, capital reserves and profit reserves, as 
well as internal and external debt. 
 
Corporate taxation data are taken from the IBFD, and from tax surveys provided by the 
tax advisory companies Ernst&Young, PwC and KPMG. 
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Table 1: German Inbound FDI 1996 – 2004 
 
Home 
Country 
Number of  
Observations 
Share of Internal 
Debt from Foreign 
Parent Company 
Tax Rate 
Difference
Average Number of 
Investments  
Australia 33 .358 .021 4 
Austria            1,245 .240 .019 139 
Belgium            564 .284 -.033 64 
Canada             162 .280 -.063 19 
Cyprus             21 .215 .130 3 
Czech Rep.          40 .340 .019 5 
Denmark            745 .284 .040 83 
Finland            189 .345 .077 22 
France             1,988 .249 -.014 223 
Great Britain      1,276 .270 .051 144 
Greece a) . . . .
Hungary            39 .367 .158 5 
Iceland a) 12 .283 .074 . 
Ireland            63 .488 .251 8 
Italy               905 .281 -.069 101 
Japan              2,257 .339 -.100 252 
Korea (Rep.)       165 .393 .056 21 
Lithuania a) . . . .
Luxembourg         388 .235 .001 44 
Mexico a) 12 .138 .014 . 
Netherlands 2,429 .281 .010 273 
Norway             177 .279 .078 21 
Poland             30 .212 .042 3 
Portugal           25 .281 .038 3 
Slovakia a) . . . .
Slovenia           75 .221 .109 9 
Spain              300 .211 -.043 35 
Sweden            565 .249 .076 64 
Switzerland        2,725 .276 .112 306 
Turkey             51 .316 -.013 6 
USA                2,880 .280 -.051 330 
Total 19,379 .280 .003 2,195 
The table shows a per-country apportionment of parent companies for German inward FDI from 1996 until 
2004. Data are taken from the MiDi database provided by the Deutsche Bundesbank. Internal debt shares are 
country-specific mean values, determined by the level of balance sheet liabilities divided by total capital. The 
table also shows average statutory tax-rate differences between Germany and respective foreign locations, as 
well as the yearly average number of investments. 
a) Not reported due to data protection, because the number of observations is small. 
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Definition Mean Std.Dev. Min. Max.
ICL  internal debt share from .280 .262 .001 .992 
foreign parent company 
FG STRSTR  tax-rate difference .003 .072 -.152 .281
FSTR  foreign tax rate .354 .071 .100 .532
Loss carry-forward binary .431 .495 0 1
Turnover turnover in €1,000 65,088 247,678 1,000 11,000,000
Observations: 19,379. Minimum and maximum values are averages of the 3 smallest (highest) values. 
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Table 3: Inter Company Loans – Thin-Capitalization Reform in 2001 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
FG STRSTR  .188 
* .192 * .206 * .207 ** .214 ** 
(.088) (.088) (.087) (.087) (.088) 
TGROUPD .001 .002 .018 
(.019) (.019) (.020) 
TGROUPD POSTxD  -.025 
*
(.010)   
TGROUPD x 1997   -.006 
(.018) 
TGROUPD x 1998       -.016 
(.019) 
TGROUPD x 1999         -.025 
(.017) 
TGROUPD x 2000         -.024 
(.018) 
TGROUPD x 2001           -.004 -.021 
(.012) (.020) 
TGROUPD x 2002         -.036 
* -.052 *
(.015) (.023)  
TGROUPD x 2003         -.032 
* -.049 *
(.011) (.020) 
TGROUPD x 2004        -.038 
* -.054 *
(.016) (.023) 
1997 -.003 -.003 -.003 -.003 .003 
(.005) (.005) (.005) (.005) (.017) 
1998 -.002 -.002 -.002 -.002 .013 
(.006) (.006) (.006) (.006) (.017) 
1999 -.001 -.001 -.002 -.002 .022 
(.005) (.005) (.005) (.005) (.016) 
2000 -.000 -.000 -.000 -.000 .022 
(.006) (.006) (.006) (.006) (.017) 
2001 .002 .002 .025 ** .006 .022 
(.005) (.005) (.011) (.012) (.019) 
2002 -.011 -.010 .013 .023 .038 
(.006) (.007) (.011) (.015) (.021) 
2003 -.024 ** -.024 ** -.001 .006 .020 
(.006) (.006) (.010) (.011) (.018) 
2004 -.022 ** -.022 ** .001 .013 .028 
(.007) (.007) (.007) (.016) (.021) 
ln(Turnover)           -.016 ** -.015 ** -.015 ** -.015 ** -.015 **
(.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) 
Loss carry-forward      .009 .009 .009 .009 
(.005) (.005) (.005) (.005) 
Observations 19,379 19,379 19,379 19,379 19,379 
Adj. 2R .711 .711 .711 .711 .711 
The dependent variable is the share of inter-company loans borrowed from the foreign parent company. Ro-
bust and clustered (country/year clusters) standard errors are in parentheses. A star denotes significance at 
5% and two stars at the 1% level. All estimates include a full set of 5,257 firm and 56 industry fixed effects. 
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Table 4: Inter Company Loans – Thin-Capitalization Reform in 2001 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
FG STRSTR  .201 
* .216 * .224 * .783 ** .750 ** .737 ** 
(.089) (.088) (.090) (.287) (.288) (.294) 
TGROUPD .003 .019  .019 .100 
(.019) (.020)  (.074) (.084) 
TGROUPD POSTxD  -.025 
* -.101 ** 
(.010)   (.018)  
TGROUPD x 1997    -.006   -.044 
(.018)   (.028) 
TGROUPD x 1998        -.017   -.017 
(.019)   (.035) 
TGROUPD x 1999          -.026   -.036 
(.017)   (.032)  
TGROUPD x 2000             -.024   -.085 
*
(.018)   (.034) 
TGROUPD x 2001           -.020   -.125 
*
(.020)   (.038) 
TGROUPD x 2002         -.053 
* -.151 *
(.023)   (.041) 
TGROUPD x 2003         -.050 
* -.193 *
(.020)   (.042) 
TGROUPD x 2004        -.052 
* -.221 *
(.023)   (.046) 
1997 -.002 -.002 .003 -.006 -.006 .003 
(.006) (.006) (.017) (.014) (.015) (.019) 
1998 -.002 -.002 .013 .007 .006 .009 
(.006) (.006) (.017) (.013) (.014) (.018) 
1999 -.002 -.002 .022 .019 .015 .020 
(.005) (.005) (.016) (.013) (.014) (.018) 
2000 -.000 -.000 .022 .008 .000 .016 
(.006) (.006) (.017) (.015) (.015) (.019) 
2001 .003 .026 * .022 .026 .040 .040 
(.006) (.011) (.019) (.020) (.020) (.023) 
2002 -.010 .013 .039 .034 .046 * .051 *
(.007) (.011) (.021) (.020) (.021) (.024) 
2003 -.024 ** -.002 .021 .006 .018 .031 
(.006) (.011) (.018) (.017) (.018) (.021) 
2004 -.019 ** .003 .028 .018 .029 ** .048 
(.007) (.012) (.021) (.020) (.020) (.025) 
ln(Turnover)           -.014 ** -.014 ** -.014 ** -.019 ** -.017 * -.018 *
(.004) (.004) (.004) (.007) (.007) (.007) 
Loss carry-forward     .009 .009 .009 -.011 -.013 -.014 
(.006) (.005) (.005) (.015) (.014) (.014) 
Observations 18,787 18,787 18,787 2,196 2,196 2,196 
Adj. 2R .714 .714 .714 .806 .810 .811 
The dependent variable is the share of inter-company loans borrowed from the foreign parent company. 
Specifications (1) - (3) are based on a sample of ordinary corporations and partnerships. Specifications (4) - 
(6) are based on a sample, which consists of holding corporations and partnerships. Robust and clustered 
(country/year clusters) standard errors are in parentheses. A star denotes significance at 5% and two stars at 
the 1% level. All estimates include a full set of 5,105/738 firm and 56 industry fixed effects. 
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Table 5: Inter Company Loans – Thin-Capitalization Reform in 2004 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
FG STRSTR  .192 
* .193 * .406 * .410 *
(.088) (.088) (.201) (.200) 
TGROUPD .050 
* .026 
(.020)  (.024) 
TGROUPD 2004xD  -.068 
* -.042 *
(.021)  (.019) 
1997 -.003 -.003   
(.005) (.005)   
1998 -.002 -.002   
(.006) (.006)   
1999 -.001 -.001   
(.005) (.005)   
2000 -.000 -.000   
(.006) (.006)   
2001 .002 .002   
(.005) (.006)   
2002 -.010 -.011 -.014 ** -.014 **
(.007) (.007) (.004) (.004) 
2003 -.024 ** -.024 ** -.034 ** -.035 **
(.006) (.006) (.005) (.005) 
2004 -.022 ** -.020 ** -.029 ** -.028 **
(.007) (.007) (.005) (.005) 
ln(Turnover)           -.015 ** -.015 ** -.009 -.009 
(.004) (.004) (.007) (.007) 
Loss carry-forward     .009 .009 .026 * .026 *
(.005) (.005) (.010) (.010) 
Observations 19,379 19,379 7,980 7,980 
Adj. 2R .711 .712 .773 .773 
The dependent variable is the share of inter-company loans borrowed from the foreign parent company. 
Specifications (1) - (2) are based on the whole sample, whereas (3) and (4) are based on a sample in which 
only observations from 2001 until 2004 are considered. Robust and clustered (country/year clusters) standard 
errors are in parentheses. A star denotes significance at 5% and two stars at the 1% level. All estimates in-
clude a full set of 5,257 or 3,196 firm, and 56 industry fixed effects. 
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